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PAYMENT BY CHECK OF INSOLVENT
PRIOR TO BANKRUPTCY
By L. L. RIESELBACH*
In the transaction of the daily business of the commercial world,
the presentation of a check is the most frequent and convenient method
of payment regardless of regularly constituted tender. Banks, for the
accommodation of business, very frequently cash personal checks for
customers and acquaintances. The law merchant and the codification of
the common law establish and assist the easy negotiability of checks
while attempting at the same time to safeguard the assignee or payee
and the depository on which the instrument is drawn.
Where the check clears through the drawee bank and is honored,
we have the customary course of affairs. There arises, however, with
startling frequency the situation of the check being returned to the
party receiving the same because of insufficient funds to the credit
of the drawer. Where the drawer subsequently becomes bankrupt,
either before or after the check has been made good but within four
months of the original transaction, an interesting question arises, in-
volving rules of law which cause the courts some difficulty because of
seeming hardship inflicted by the result.
Does the holder of the n.s.f. check have a prior claim on funds in
bankruptcy? Can the trustee in bankruptcy maintain an action because
of a preference where the bank cashing a check has demanded and
received from the drawer payment therof after the return of the instru-
ment for insufficient funds?
A typical instance is the recent case of Schwemer, Trustee, etc., vs.
First Wisconzsin National Bank. The bankrupt, pursuant to a kiting
scheme had continually presented his checks drawn upon his depository
to the defendant and received the amount specified in the instrument.
The customary climax to so cavalier a method of obtaining a loan was
reached when five checks cashed with the defendant on two successive
days were returned to the defendant by the drawee bank because of
insufficient funds on deposit to the credit of the drawer. The defendant
bank demanded and, at th expense of the drawer's stock in trade,
received repayment of the moneys advanced. Bankruptcy ensued within
two weeks.
The trustee in bankruptcy commenced his action to set aside the
*Member of Milwaukee Bar
I United States Dist. Ct., Eastern Dist. Visc. (1930)
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repayment and recover the amount paid as constituting a preferential
transfer, voidable by the representative of the creditors in an action in
equity for that purpose.
It was held that all the elements of voidable preference existed and
the defendant was ordered to turn over to the trustee the amount
received by it upon the n.s.f. checks. The opinion apparently disregards
the kiting in reaching its decision.
The far reaching effect of such a holding upon mercantile and
banking transactions is apparent. It is the purpose of this note to con-
sider the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act and the Negotiable
Instrument Law sections governing the situation.
ELEMENTS OF PREFERENCE"
In order to establish a voidable preference, the burden is upon the
trustee2 to prove that there has been (1) a transfer by the bankrupt
(2) while insolvent (3) to a creditor (4) upon an antecedent indebt-
edness thus diminishing the assets (5) within four months prior to
bankruptcy (6) whereby the transferee had reasonable cause to be-
lieve that by such transfer a preference would be effected and (7)
whereby the transferee receives a greater proportion upon the indebted-
ness than other creditors of the same class would receive 3. These con-
stituents concurring form the necessary components of the action.'
The voidable preference is entirely a creation of statute. At com-
mon law, a debtor might deal with his property as he pleased. His was
the title and his the right. His friends and relatives might be paid while
others were ignored. The only curtailment of the right of alienation
was the acquisition by a vigilant creditor of a lien by legal procedure.
Since the owner might freely dispose of his chattels, conversely, the
property might be seized on levy without restriction by other creditors.
The common law was adequate where credit was the rarity and not the
rule, where the creditor was his debtor's neighbor and each had the
opportunity to observe the lessening volume of trade, the awkwardness
of the handicraft or the other preliminary indicia of insolvency.
In a more complex civilization, the system handicapped the giving
of credit and the statutory regulation was the necessary outgrowth of
commercial demand. The trustee as a functionary of the court was
delegated to supervise and compel an equal distribution in this branch
of bankruptcy jurisdiction, to assure all that neither friendly nor
oppressive creditors obtain a preference.
An analysis of many decisions relating to voidable preferences dis-
2 Pyle vs. Texas Transp. & Term. Co. 238 U. S. 90, 59 L. ed. 1215, 35 S. Ct. 667
- Walker vs. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850
'Bankruptcy Act. Sec. 60b
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closes that the courts regard the avoiding of the transfer as the doing
of equity to all persons of the same class of creditors.5 They regard the
time element and the solvency of the creditors as the two dimensions
to be scrutinized most closely. While, for the most part, the word
trust is assiduously avoided,6 the rationale of many cases is that when
assets are diminished to the point of equalling or being less than
liabilities, they constitute an equitable trust for all general creditors
until the condition is either alleviated or brought to liquidation.' Since
it is the Bankruptcy Act that creates the right under discussion, it prob-
ably would be more accurate to say that the trust crystallizes at the
time of bankruptcy and is retroactive for a period of four months.
For the most part, the courts accept the remedy as being purely statu-
tory and avoid the metaphysical discussion of causal theory. The con-
clusion is drawn from a strict compliance with the letter of the statute.
The type of preference herein described, i.e. that voidable at the
instance of the trustee should not be confused with that which is an
act of bankruptcy and requires the intent of the insolvents or with a
mere preference, an innocent 9 transfer on the part of the recipient and
transferor or which enables the creditor to obtain a greater percentage
than others of the same class1 ° but valid by reason of the non-existence
of all or any one of the elements above described. Thus a preference
may, by the intent of the transferor, be an act of bankruptcy and still
be unimpeachable as a voidable transfer. The purpose of the two sec-
tions of the Bankruptcy Act applicable as to the effect of the preference
is widely divergent, the one to justify an involuntary petition for bank-
ruptcy administration; the other to nullify an unjust distribution of the
insolvent's assets.
So, too, should the payment by a third party endorser to the check
or sureties to a note11 be disassociated from the topic under discussion
as not being a transfer of the bankrupt. Where payments are by third
parties the bankrupt estate is not depleted and no voidable preference
ensues1  however much the transferee may benefit or surpass the re-
maining creditors in proportionate recovery upon the respective obliga-
tions.
In a voidable preference actual fraudulent intent is immaterial. A
transfer may be both fraudulent in fact and preferential but the so-
5 Edison Electric Illminary Co. vs. Tibbetts, 241 Fed. 468
6 In re Keller, 109. 118
7 Levenbaunt vs. Hanover Trust Co., 253 Mass. 19, 148 N. E. 227
6 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 3a (3) ; Taylor vs. Carrawav, 282 Fed. 876
9 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 60a
10 In re Bailey, 110 Fed. 928
11 Doyle vs. Milw. Nat. Bk., 116 Fed. 295
12 In re Kerlin, 209 Fed. 42
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called elements of preference need not be proved to permit the trustee
to avoid the fraudulent conveyance and recover the property so trans-
ferred.13 Occasionally, the court apparently fails to distinguish between
the two but the same result is achieved on other bases. 14
Obviously the items considered above as numbers (2), (5), and (7)
are reduced to mathematical computation and for our particular prob-
lem offer little difficulty. The payment of money is considered a trans-
fer15 and is included in our designation at number (1) although the
use of the word transfer has been deprecated as possibly implying
chattels or realty. The Bankruptcy Act refers to "property" as the
subject of a transfer.1 6
TO A CREDITOR
Whatever confusion may have existed as to the nature of a check
under the common law or law merchant is remedied to a large extent
by the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law. In the uniform
act adopted in Wisconsin a check is considered as a bill of exchange
payable on demand and drawn on a banking institution.' 7 The negotia-
tion of a check does not operate as an assignment of a fund on deposit
to the credit of the drawee bank,'8 in the absence of express stipula-
tion.19
"Under the law, a check is an instrument by which a depositor seeks
to withdraw funds from a bank and as between the drawer and the
payee, it is an evidence of indebtedness ... an action may be brought
thereon as upon a promissory note." Lipton vs. Cohmbia Trust Co.,
194 App. Div. 384, 185 N.Y.S. 198.
To the effect that a check is merely a negotiable instrument the
rulings of the courts in the various jurisdictions wherein the Negotiable
Instrument Act represents the codification of the law merchant as well
as in states under the common law have been uniform.20
A minority holding limits the application of the specific negation of
assignment of the specified amount as between the drawer and the bank
'3 Coder vs. Arts, 213 U. S. 223, 53 L. ed. 772, 29 S. Ct. 436
14 In re Hawkins, 243 Fed 792
15 Carson Pirie 's. Chic. Title & Trust Co., 182 U. S. 438, 45 L. ed. 1171, 21 S.
Ct. 906
16 Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 1 A (25)
17 Wisc. St. 1929 Ch. 118.61
Is Wisc. St. 1929 Ch. 118.65
19 Donohoe-Kelly Banking Co., vs. So. Pacific Co., 138 Cal. 183, 71 Pac. 93, 94
Am. st. Rep. 28
20 Cainas Prairie State Bank vs. Newman, 15 Idaho 719, 99 Pac. 883, 138
Am. St. Rep. 81, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 703
Kulzberg Mfg. Co. vs. Smith, 173 Minn. 504, 218 NAV. 99
National Product Bank vs. Doods, 205 Ill. App. 444
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for the latter's protection from a double liability. As between drawer
and payee an equitable assignment is held to subsist.2 1 Although an
earlier case 22 placed a similar strained construction upon the section
no other decisions have attempted to breach the line of holdings indi-
cated.
The Wisconsin court cites as the prevailing Federal rule that "until
accepted or paid a check is revocable as is pointed out by Hand, Jus-
tice, in re Gubelman, 13 Fed. (2d) 732, 734 and does not operate as
an equitable assignment. ' 2
3
Apart from the statutory regulation, the bank or person trans-
ferring funds or credit upon receipt of a check is the purchaser of the
paper 2 4 upon the representations contained therein. He becomes the
owner and holder of the title to the instrument whether honored or
protested for non-payment.25 If payment is stopped, the instrument is
defective, or the depository has insufficient funds to the credit of the
drawer, the check operates merely as a written evidence of indebted-
ness on which an action may be brought. If such action were no avail-
able, the remedy of the payee at common law would have been
indebitatus assumpsit on money had and received. The bank can not,
except for the existence of a Banking Code as enacted in Wisconsin
or an express contract with its customer or the drawer, maintain the
theory that it is acting only as agent for collection subject to the clear-
ance at the depository. This obviously is true where cash has been
paid, and is held equally the law where the account is credited. 26 The
contention that the original purchase and the payment for the instru-
ment at the depository bank are part of a single transaction and totally
void unless completed, likewise leaves the parties as debtor and credi-
tor.2 7 To remedy this, where checks are received for deposit, it is the
custom of the banks to enter into express agreements adding to the
provisions of the Banking Code.
In bankruptcy the obligation being for a definite amount and not
contingent upon future circumstances, is considered a provable claim
either under the theory of tort or contractual relationship and is allow-
able as such. 28 The absence of the intent to become a creditor can not
21 Elgin vs. Gross-Kelly, 20 N.M. 450, 150 Pac. LRA 1916A 711
22 Hove vs. Stanhope Bank, 138 Ia. 39, 115 N.WAr. 476
23 Union State Ban.k vs. Peoples State Bank, 198 Wisc. 28, 211 N.W. 931
24 Aebi vs. Bank of Evansville, 124 Wisc. 73, 68 L.R.A. 964, 199 Am. St. Rep. 925
25 Bnrton vs. U. S. 196 U. S. 283, 25 S. Ct. 243, 49 L. ed. 482
26Id.
Douglas vs. Fed. Reserve Bank, 271 U. S. 489, 25 Ct. 243 70 L. ed. 1051
27 Equitable Trust Co. vs. Rochling, etc., 275 U.S. 248, 48 S. Ct. 28, L. ed. 264
28 Clingman vs. Miller, 160 Fed. 326
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avoid the practical effect of the transaction.2 9 Whether the indebtedness
can be discharged in bankruptcy or not has no bearing on the relation-
ship of the parties and can not alter the status.
Active fraud, conversion, or theft permit the following of goods
into the hands of the bankrupt or his trustee upon the rationale which
permits the establishment of a trust ex maleficio and the tracing
thereof3" although the acceptance of security may be considered a
waiver of trust funds.3 1 Conversely, the retaking of the identical money
given or wares sold does not constitute a voidable preference.
Whether the mere presentation of a check is a warranty and the
basis of recission for fraud is not free from difficulty. It is held that
the drawer undertakes by the giving of the instrument that the drawee
will be found at the place described, that he has in his possession
belonging to the drawer the amount specified and that he is bound to
pay.32 With any added representation there can be little doubt but what
the right to rescind exists and a trust by operation of law arises.
Where the check is given for cash and returned n.s.f. the likelihood
of maintaining the fund intact and thus establishing a trust, aside from
the difficulty of proof, as a practical matter is very small.
Where funds are commingled with other moneys, the series of
cases arising out of the amazing financial operations of Ponzi holds
that claims evolving out of that genius's fraud were not prior claims
in bankruptcy and that repayment after rescission and within four
months of the bankruptcy were transfers constituting voidable pref-
erences.2 3 Holding the contrary view is Fry vs. Penn Trust Co.,3 4
which maintains the position that restitution after a defalcation could
not be preferential. This attitude is rare. The following quotation from
the prevailing line of cases is significant of the majority's attitude,
having in full contemplation the tort theory.
Miller & Company (defendant) having elected to receive payment
for these damages instead of endeavoring to recover the eggs them-
selves can not be heard to say that they were not creditors of Pendle-
ton (bankrupt) on May 4, 1904, and were the owners of the claim
against Pendleton, provable in bankruptcy, which had existed since the
date of the conversion of the eggs by Pendleton. If we take the posi-
tion that Miller & Company had the right to waive the tort and treat
the sale as valid, we are in no better position, for that would ratify the
20 National City Bank vs. Hotchkiss, 231 U. S. 50, 58 L. ed. 115, 34 S. Ct. 20
304 Remington on Bankruptcy, 1929 Supp. 192
31 Field, trustee etc. vs. Harrison, 18 Fed. (2d) 729
32Raphael vs. People's Bank, 45 Cal. App. 115, 187 Pac. 53
33 Cznninghamz vs. Brown, 265 U. S., 68 L. ed. 873, 44 S. Ct. 424
34 15 Pa. 343, 46 AtL. 10
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delivery of the eggs without payment and constitute Miller & Co. cred-
itors beyond question.""5
Since the intent to become a creditor is immaterial it follows that
one from whom money is stolen is in no better position than he who
has relied upon a check and vice versa; and, where funds can not be
traced and identified, no trust by implication of law arises.
"The fallacy of defendant's contention that, because its money was
in effect stolen the repayment of a like amount could not effect a pref-
erence, requires no exposition. No effort was made to trace the bank's
money into the jewelry sold to raise the sum repaid to the bank. See
Cunningham vs. Brown, 265 U.S. 1, 44 S. Ct. 424, 68 L. ed 873." '
The relationship is held to be that of debtor and creditor.
Where, however, money was obtained upon spurious bills of lading
and the merchandise later shipped, the transaction was upheld but
had not, however, been attacked as a preference." The general rule is
that the acceptance of other property than the converted goods waives
the tort and any right that might have accrued under the theory of a
trust ex mnaleficio.38
UPoN ANTECEDErNT INDEBTEL)NESS
It is apparent that upon the relation of debtor and creditor arising
as a matter of law the time of payment becomes material. If the
exchange of consideration for consideration is simultaneous " or pay-
ment for consideration instantaneous the transaction is terminated and,
if the consideration is adequate, 40 no claim of voidable preference can
be maintained 41 by the trustee. A lapse of time however small has
the effect of making the transfer of security preferential. 4 2
The test generally applied is whether or not the assets of the bank-
rupt which would otherwise be available for distribution to the gen-
eral creditors have been diminished by the transaction. While the giving
of security of an), nature upon a pre-existing indebtedness within the
statutory period considered without reference to the adequacy of the
past consideration is without doubt included in the prohibition,4 3 the
35 Cliugman vs. Miller, 160 Fee. 326, 20 A. B.R. 360
31 Wlalser, Trustee etc. vs. International Union Bank, 21 Fed. (2d) 294
37 Los-ell vs. Newman & Son, 192 Fed. 753
3s Btargoyne vs. McKillip, 182 Fed. 452
a. Stedinan vs. Bank of Monroe, 117 Fed. 237
40 Harding vs. Fed. Nat. Bank, 31 Fed. (2d) 914
41 Sawyer vs. Turpin, 91 U. S. 114, 23 L. ed. 235
42National City Bank vs. Holchkiss, 231 U. S. 50, 34 S. Ct. 20, 58 L. ed. 115
43 Bailey vs. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268, 60 L. ed. 275 365. Ct. 50
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exchange of securities, values being equal44 does not constitute a void-
able transfer 45 even though made after the service of an involuntary
petition in bankruptcy.4 6 Knowledge that the proceeds of a sale for an
adequate present consideration are to be applied toward a transfer
clearly preferential and so intended has been held to avoid the general
rule of diminution of the estate as the criterion"- upon the theory that
there exists in the transaction an active intent to work a fraud in fact
not alone upon creditors but upon the Bankruptcy Act itself and to
establish by circuity what could not have been accomplished directly.48
But such cases turn upon fraud in fact rather than voidable preference.
In loose business terminology the transfer of wares for a check
is considered a cash transaction. The drawer of the instrument acquires
for his general estate certain chattels or realty and apparently relin-
quishes and transfers all claim to a specified fund of equal value. This
is palpably the contemplation of the parties when cash is transferred
upon receipt of a check. Under the Negotiable Instrument Law, how-
ever, it is obvious that whether the apparent intent miscarries or not
the status of debtor and creditor subsists as between parties until the
obligation evidenced by the check is met. As a matter of law, the term,
a cash transaction, is an unfortunate misnomer.
Consider as a single transaction there appears to be no diminution
of the assets of the drawer of the checks. His instrument is given for
value received. He adds to his general assets the money or merchandise
and orders an equal value to be transferred to the paye6 of the instru-
ment. Under the scrutiny of courts applying the Negotiable Instru-
ments Act, the giving and receiving are, however, isolated as separate
transactions both where the instrument is known or believed to have
been valueless at the time of acceptance, 49 or taken in perfect good
faith at the time of the sale of merchandise 50 and the acceptance of
any security in lieu of the n.s.f. check held to establish a waiver of
a right to rescind and thus constitute a voidable preference.5'
If the sale is thus dissected as to the time element, the drawer's
estate is first enriched in toto by the accretion of the merchandise or
cash, although there arises simultaneously the obligation as a general
creditor, and subsequently depleted to an equal amount by the presen-
44 In re Manning, 123 Fed. 180
45In re Perpall-Haninerslough, 256 Fed. 758
46 Matter of Perpall, 271 Fed. 466
47 Dean vs. Davis, 242 U. S. 438, 61 L. ed. 419.37S. Ct. 130
4s Bank of Newport vs. Herkiiner Co. Bk., 225 U.S. 178, 56 L. ed. 1042, 32 S.
Ct. 633
49 Goetz vs. Zeif, 181 Wise. 628, 195 N. WV. 874
:0 Security etc., Bank vs. Sta'ats et al., 230 Fed. 514
51 Id. and Field Trustee vs. Harrison et al., 18 Fed. (2d) 729
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tation and honoring of the bill of exchange so conveniently called a
check. When the check is honored, obviously the drawer's indebtedness
is diminished to an equal extent. The preference therein, it will be
observed, is not the giving of the instrument but the payment of it out
of the bankrupt's estate.5 2 Had bankruptcy intervened prior to the cash-
ing of the check, the financial status remaining as of that time, a larger
percentage would inure to each creditor upon distribution.
Justice Holmes indicates the line of cleavage both as to the time
element so as to make the transfers upon an antecedent obligation,
and as to the diminution of the estate in National City Bank vs. Hotch-
kiss, '3 considered a leading case on the subject.
"The consent to become a general creditor for an hour, that was
imported, even if not intended to have that effect, by the liberty allowed
to the firm, broke the continuity and established the loan as part of
the assets. No doubt many general creditors have increased a bank-
rupt's estate by their advances, but they have lost the right to take them
back." National City Bank vs. Hotchkiss, supra.
Upon strict logic, where the added element of "reasonable cause to
believe" the drawer insolvent existed, payment of any check tendered
to the vendor would be tantamount to a preference voidable by the
potential trustee in bankruptcy although knowledge of insolvency can
not possibly vitiate a sale for cash. Consequently the courts have earn-
estly sought facts in each case to minimize the drastic effect of the rule.
Where the rule delineated has been partly abrogated because of the
recognition by the court of the inherent danger to the easy negotiability
of checks and seeking to avoid the palpably startling result 54 the prece-
dent has been characterized as "dangerous doctrine"55 because of the
inroads upon the strict applicability of the Bankruptcy Act.
The intent that title should not pass until payment wis made
swayed the court in Re Perpall6 where stock certificates were delivered
earlier in the business day than the check for the payment therefor
was received . . . "that a few hours transpired and they could not
be said to be literally contemporaneously made, was because of the
business and the practices in the custom of this business." In Goetz vs.
Zeif 57, however, the court, under circumstances apparently similar,
scrutinized the transaction in the light of the cases cited, followed the
,2 In re Harrison Bros. 197 Fed. 320
53231 U. S. 50, 34 S. Ct. 20, 58 L. ed. 115
54 Illinois Parlor Grame Co. vs. Goldman, 257 Fed. 300
54 Remington on Bankruptcy, 459 n
3r 271 Fed. 466
.7 181 Wisc. 628, 195 N.W. 874
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prevailing rule, and reached conclusion opposite from the stockbroker
case.
Payment by check is specifically held not to be inconsistent with a
cash transaction in Hough vs. Atchison etc. Ry. Co.,"8 but the facts
show a reliance upon the release of lien for freight charges fraud-
ulently obtained. The case is clearly not in line with cases above cited
holding fraud immaterial, although dihtinguishable on facts. The right
of stoppage in transitu granted a vendor by the Sales Act is not affected
by the bankruptcy"8 so long as there has been no delivery to the bank-
rupt or his agent.
REASONABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE
The necessity of proof by the trustee that the creditor had, at the
time of the transfer, reasonable cause to believe a preference would
be effected by itGO limits the jeopardy of check transactions.
Reason to believe is derived from such facts or circumstances as
would cause the customary prudent man to investigate and the creditor
is presumed to possess knowledged of all facts which such an investi-
gation would disclose.6 ' Like all questions of reasonable cause, it
resolves into a question of fact 2 based on the relationship subsisting
at and prior to the time of the transaction between the parties.
Discovery of fraud makes investigation imperative6 3 and repay-
ment thereafter is a voidable preference.6 4 Where discoverable insolv-
ency exists at the time of such payment.
"That the debtor did commit the crime of forgery to enable him
to secure loans of money would indicate to the ordinary intelligent
mind that his financial condition was desperate." Watchmaker vs.
Barnes."'
Circumstances warranting the inference of knowledge are varied.
An assignment of accounts to secure an existing indebtedness is in
itself sufficient to put the bank on inquiry and, therefore, there was
reasonable cause to believe that such assignment would effect a pref-
erence.6 ' The taking up of accommodation paper before due and the
substitution of accounts is held sufficient to charge creditor with
5834 Fed. (2d) 238
"o In re Darlington, 163 Fed. 38960 Bankruptcy Act Sec. 60b
61 Coder vs. McPherson, 152 Fed. 951
62 Kaufman vs. Treadway, 195 U.S. 271, 49 L. ed. 190, 25 S. Ct. 33
63 Walser, Trustee, etc., vs. International Union Bank, 21 Fed. (2d) 294
64 Goetz vs Zeif, 181 Wisc. 628, 195 N.W. 874
65 259 Fed. 783
66Eyges vs. Boylston National Bank, 294 Fed. 286
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knowledge.6 7 Frequent visits of the debtor affording the creditor an
opportunity to inquire into and determine the debtor's condition are
held to be circumstances from which the inference of knowledge is
drawn from the availability of facts to determine the financial stand-
ing of the bankrupt. 8
Failure to pay some notes while taking up others in itself has been
held to impute knowledge of insolvency to the creditor. 9 Payment in
merchandise or out of the usual course of business is sufficient basis
to cause inquiry.70 Knowledge of banking transactions of the debtor
such as over-drafts7 1 forced payments thereon,7 2 or the permitting of
checks to go to protest7 3 has been held to be ample to establish reason-
able cause to believe a preference would be established.
The question of fact in its ultimate analysis is not whether the
defendant knew the bankrupt to have been insolvent7 4 or even believed73
him so. If the creditor had in his possession information which would
incite the ordinary man to inquiry and which upon investigation would
have shown the true facts of the creditors financial condition, he is
chargeable with knowledge.";
On the other hand, inability to meet debts is not of itself sufficient
reason to believe.7 7 Nor is the expressed belief the man is "crooked"
for a person may be dishonest and still amply solvent.-, The creditor's
being in arrears in payment is not sufficient foundation for the belief
where security is taken for the arrearage 7 for the bankruptcy defini-
tion of insolvent varies from that of the state courts and is that the
assets at a fair valuation do not equal the liabilities."" Thus difficulties
due to a market depression or deflation of value as is the current situa-
tion is not sufficient8' without other proof. These facts may constitute
reason for inquiry but there is no presumption of insolvency based
upon them.
67 Matter of Star Spring Bed Co., 265 Fed. 133
68 Benjamin vs. Buell, 268 Fed. 792
69 Cohen vs. Trenzont Trust Co., 256 Fed. 399
70 In re Andrews, 135 Fed. 599
-1 Field vs. Harrison, 18 Fed. (2d) 759; In re Brayton
72 WI'alser, Trustee vs. International Union Bank, 21 Fed (2d) 294;
Roys vs. First Nat. Bk. of Monroe, 183 Wisc. 10, 197 N.V. 237
731 ansen vs. Nathenson Bros. Co., 31 Fed. (2d) 896
74 Buchanan St. Bank vs. De Groot, 39 Fed. (2d) 397
7.. In re Eggert, 102 Fed., 735
76 W'alsh vs. Lowell Trust Co., 245 Mass. 455x, 139 N.E. 789
-7 O'Gradv vs. Chautauqua Builders Supply Co., 33 Fed. (2) 956
78 Jonas vs. State Nat'l. Bank of Garland,-Tex Civ. App.-290 S.W. 925
7O Manly vs. Southern Supply Co., 14 Fed. (2d) 273
SIn re Pettengill & Co., 135 Fed. 218, Bankruptcy Act Sec. la (15)
81 Closson vs. Ne'wberrv's Hdwe. Co., 283 Fed. 33
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It should be noted the facts must be such as would give a reason-
able man the inference that a preference would and not merely might
result from the transfer.8 2 The difficulties of proof in drawing the dis-
tinction gives the court or jury considerable latitude in the finding of
fact.
If the creditor had not come to the realization that his debtor was
in a precarious financial condition at any prior time, the fact that he
did not actually investigate will afford no excuse where the creditor's
information was sufficient to put the ordinary man upon inquiry.8'
A person cannot by intentionally closing his eyes to the situation or
being stupid obtain an advantage over the intelligent vigilant creditors.
The knowledge of an agent is by the Bankruptcy Act considered
the knowledge of the principal and the same degree of care is nec-
essary.
8 4
It should be noted that the time at which the indicia giving rise to
the suspicions of insolvency must exist is not at the giving of the check,
but the payment thereof. As a matter of reason the return of a check
because of insufficient funds in the depository should be due warning
that the financial situation of the drawer is precarious and from that
moment the payee is charged with knowledge of all the facts he might
have ascertained by a actual investigation Payment thereafter consti-
tutes a preference 5 voidable in bankruptcy by the trustee,16
The vendor is somewhat protected by such right to rescission as
he may have upon the dishonor of the check. If the payee retains his
right of rescission, asserts it properly, and subsequently resells for cash
to the insolvent, he apparently is transgressing no rule of preference.
If this course is followed, all steps should be taken without ambiguity
so no waiver of the rescission, or estoppel in pais can be invoked to
defeat his purpose. Inability by reason of the dissipation to seize the
opportunity afforded by the fraud to rescind, of the res or the waiver
of the right to rescind by the acceptance of security make payment
a transfer upon preexisting indebtedness and voidable by the trustee.8
The vendor of merchandise thus has a very apparent advantage
over the bank that accommodatingly cashes a check. By the creation
of a trust ex maleficio he is, under ordinary circumstances, assured of
82Sonner vs. Park, 270 Fed. 675
83 Matter of Campion et al, 256 Fed. 902, 43 A.B.R. 625;
McDonald & Sons, 178 Fed. 487
Rogers vs. Page, 140 Fed 596, 72C.C.A. 164
s4 Collet vs. Bronx National Bank, 205 Fed. 370
8-, [Valser, Trustee vs. International Bank, 21 Fed (2d) 294
8 Schzwemer etc. vs. First Wisconsin National Bank, U.S. Dist Ct. Eastern Dist.
of \Visconsin (1930)
87 Security Bank vs. Staats Co., 233 Fed. 514
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at least a pro tanto recoupment by rescission as to the merchandise
remaining in the vendee's possession.
The original English Bankruptcy Act. 34 Henry VIII, considered
bankruptcies as criminal and permitted the seizure of the bankrupt's
assets to be distributed by the proper official. The state of 13 Elizabeth,
too, provided for the "repression" of bankrupts. But only the fraud-
ulent conveyances of the bankrupts were attacked. Prior to the posses-
sion of the Lord Chancellor under the statutes each creditor was at
liberty of fend for himself. Alertness and lack of forbearance carried
the same reward. The modern bankruptcy acts encompass a far wider
field.
The ancient maxim that the law favors the diligent in the discussion
of the courts has yielded to the modern theory that equality is equity.
The mere scent of financial disaster might bring the avid creditors to
the debtor's door and, in the rush, those who are tolerant in the effort
to re-establish a tottering business would be the ones to suffer. This is
necessarily vicious and repugnant to the modern theory.
"It is a case the circumstances of which call strongly for the prin-
ciple that equality is equity and this is the spirit of the bankruptcy
law. Those who were successful in the race of diligence violated not
only its spirit but its letter, and secured an unlawful preference." ' ,
The circumstances under which the tradesman or bank in accepting
a check believes himself to be a party to a cash transaction do not
protect him from this reasoning unless he rescinds not only pro forma
but in fact. Where rescission is impossible, however outraged he may
be by the fraud, he receives no advantage over other general creditors.
CONCLUSION
Despite the hardship apparently occasioned by several individual
instances, it is apparent that the rationale of the decisions is one which
under the ordinary run of circumstances cannot be avoided by the
courts. They are forced to hold by an almost inexorable line of prece-
dents that the person who gives cash or credit for a check becomes the
purchaser thereof and the status of debtor and creditor arises at that
moment. The relations of the parties being established, the courts are
forced to apply, where bankruptcy has ensued, the operations of the
Bankruptcy Act. This leaves as the only alternative the loss of the
merchandise or cash except for the dividend in bankruptcy. The recov-
ery of the specific merchandise or money by implication of law upon a
88 Cunningha, Trustee etc. vs. Brown et al, 265 U.S. 1, 68 L. ed. 873, 44 S. Ct.
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trust arises ex maleficio. Where a check is returned for insufficient
funds, there are probably ample indicia upon which the purchaser of
the instrument should be compelled to investigate the financial cir-
cumstances of the drawer of the check. Where this is done, or ought
to be done, and the facts warrant reasonable inference of insolvency,
there can be no escape from the results which the courts have reached.
"It is a fine thing that in America
the profession of law is open to every-
one, however humble his origin. But
we have been too prone to keep the
office down to the level of the man
instead of raising the man to the level
that the office demands. This is a
common error of democracy."
-EvERETT FRASER.
